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Abstract  Local governments often charge developers impact fees to finance 
local public goods. This has been practiced in Chinese cities for more than two 
decades; however, no empirical studies have tested the effect of impact fees on 
real estate prices. Using a panel data set for 35 large- and medium-sized cities 
from 1998 to 2008, we find that impact fees lead to a significant increase in real 
estate prices. For a given city, an increase in impact fees by one yuan leads to an 
increase of about 5 yuan in the price of newly-built housing; a 1% increase in 
impact fees leads to an increase of 5 percentage points in the housing price index 
and 7 percentage points in the land price index. 
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JEL Classification  H71, R30, R31 
1  Introduction 
Real estate developers often have to bear part of the costs of providing urban 
infrastructure or urban public services when obtaining development permits from 
a local government. Developers can directly build infrastructure such as roads, 
sewers, and parks, or pay cash to the local government. This payment by a 
developer, whether monetary or in-kind, is called a development fee or an impact 
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fee in the US; in China, it is called the “urban infrastructure construction fee.” 
Theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of impact fees on real estate 
prices are scarce in the literature. This paper is the first attempt to use Chinese 
city level data to test the effects of impact fees on urban real estate markets. 
Specifically, we use impact fee and real estate price data from 35 large- and 
medium-sized cities in China from 1998 to 2008 and quantify the effects of 
impact fees on the prices of newly-built housing and the prices of 
newly-transferred urban land use rights (land price in abbreviation). We find that 
a one yuan increase in impact fees increases the price of newly-built housing by 
about 5 yuan. Impact fees also increase land prices, which is not consistent with 
the prediction of existing theories (Yinger, 1998). Our findings suggest that urban 
infrastructure or public services financed by impact fee revenues may have been 
capitalized into real estate prices. 
Our study provides a new angle for understanding why urban real estate prices 
have been increasing rapidly during the past two decades in China. Although 
many arguments have been proposed, such as urban economic openness, real 
estate speculation, increasing land prices, and developers’ marketing strategies, 
data-based empirical studies are quite few (Ren et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2011; 
Wu et al., 2012). Our study provides new empirical evidence showing that 
impact fees are an important factor driving real estate prices. Our findings also 
have policy implications on the ongoing debate about whether and how property 
taxation should be implemented in Chinese cities. If revenues from property 
taxation can replace impact fees, real estate price growth is expected to slow 
down. 
The next section describes the history of impact fees in China. Section 3 
reviews both the theoretical and empirical studies on the effect of impact fees on 
real estate markets. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 sets up the 
econometric models and presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. 
2  The Evolution of Impact Fees in Chinese Cities 
Impact fees in China can be dated back to the early stage of development of the 
real estate industry in Chinese cities. Wang (1992) is probably the first to 
examine the phenomenon of in-kind exactions that city governments levy on 
developers. His field survey of Shenzhen, Guangzhou, and Shanghai shows that 
local governments have difficulty in financing infrastructure and therefore 
require developers to provide some “in-kind land rents” (shiwu dizu), including 
roads, public facilities, or even public housing.1 He also finds that in-kind land 
                                                        
1 In the early 1990s, there was no urban land market in Chinese cities. Almost all urban land 
was used for free although some cities began experimenting to charge land use fees or land use 
right transfer prices. 
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rents significantly increase the prices of newly-built housing. For example, in 
1992 in Shanghai, the average construction cost per square meter of floor area 
was 600 yuan; the sale price was between 1,100–2,500 yuan. After the normal 
profits are deducted from the price-cost gap, the rest can be considered to be 
in-kind land rents. He concludes that such in-kind land rents are essentially land 
development exactions imposed by local governments because local 
governments lack stable, sufficient sources of funding to finance urban 
infrastructure. 
During the late 1990s, many cities gradually transformed in-kind land rents to 
monetary payments. Specifically, many cities directly charge developers “urban 
infrastructure construction fees” (these are referred to as “impact fees” in this 
paper). Many cities, such as Tianjin uand Dalian, state clearly that the purpose of 
charging impact fees is to help finance urban infrastructure. Furthermore, some 
cities, notably, Chongqing, Guangzhou, and Kunming, require developers to 
provide some amount of public housing, generally 10%–15% of the total floor 
area of a development project. This can be considered a social exaction based on 
the corporate social responsibility of the developer (Fu, 2009). 
The amount of fees varies substantially across cities and across building types. 
In 1996, the Tianjin government charged 165 yuan per square meter of floor area 
for ordinary housing development projects, and 205–265 yuan per square meter 
of floor area for high-quality apartments and office buildings. In 2002, the 
Beijing government charged 160 yuan per square meter of floor area for housing 
projects, and 200 yuan for non-housing projects in suburban areas; the Qingdao 
government charged 255 yuan uniformly.2 
Coincidentally, the urban infrastructure construction fee in Chinese cities is 
very similar to the impact fee in American cities. Since the 1970s population has 
been growing rapidly in many American cities, and revenues from property taxes 
are not enough to finance local public goods. Many cities have begun to require 
that developers provide some urban public services or infrastructure (in-kind 
exactions) or charge developers development fees or impact fees. Impact fees 
have generated heated debates among practitioners, the legal community, and 
government sectors; so unsurprisingly, economists have recently begun to pay 
attention to these fees (Brueckner, 1997; Burge and Ihlanfeldt, 2009; Gyourko, 
1991; Yinger, 1998). Although many case studies and a few empirical studies 
show that in general impact fees increase real estate prices, the magnitudes vary 
substantially depending on the sub-market (new homes, secondhand homes, or 
land), sample size, data quality, and empirical methodology (Evans-Cowley and 
Lawhon, 2003). To the best of our knowledge, although the impact fee policy has 
been implemented for more than two decades in China, there is no empirical 
                                                        
2 Fu (2009) documents in more detail the history of impact fees in Chinese cities. 
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study available and ours is the first to test empirically how impact fees affect real 
estate prices in Chinese cities. 
3  Literature Review 
Theoretical analysis on the effects of impact fees on real estate prices can be 
grouped into two strands. The first treats an impact fee as a tax imposed on 
developers; therefore, the standard textbook analytical tools for the incidence of 
tax are applicable. Intuitively, imposing an impact fee on developers will 
increase the price of newly-built housing; how much the housing price will 
increase depends on the price elasticity of demand for new housing, but the 
increase will be less than the impact fee itself. If the demand for new housing is 
inelastic, new homebuyers will bear the larger part of the impact fee. Secondhand 
housing is an imperfect substitute for new housing, and thus the price of 
secondhand housing will increase because part of the demand for new housing 
will be shifted to the secondhand housing market. This analytical framework 
does not take into account land value appreciation generated by the new urban 
infrastructure financed by impact fee revenues; nor does it consider migration of 
residents across cities. 
The second strand of theory considers the social benefits generated by urban 
infrastructure financed by impact fee revenues using the general equilibrium 
approach (Yinger, 1998). Yinger’s model shows that if revenues from impact fees 
were used to finance local public goods, then new house buyers will pay higher 
prices because the incremental local public goods will be capitalized into new 
house prices. In general, secondhand housing receives much less benefit from 
public investment; therefore, secondhand house buyers bear less of the impact 
fee burden. The new result of his model is that part of the impact fee incidence 
will be shifted to owners of undeveloped land, depressing the price of 
undeveloped land.3 This is very different from the development market where 
developers are competitive and impact fees can be passed on to house buyers, 
otherwise developers will exit the market. 
How much do impact fees increase real estate prices? A few pieces of 
empirical evidence are available from the USA. Those studies generally find that 
impact fees increase new house prices. Singell and Lillydahl (1990) use data 
from 429 housing transactions from Loveland, a city in Colorado, during the 
period January 1983 to December 1985 and find that since the imposition of 
impact fees in July 1984, new house prices have increased by about 5.6%. They 
argue that developers may have shifted the major part of impact fees to the 
buyers or have improved the quality of new houses in order to shift the burden of 
                                                        
3 Using data from 43 Texas cities, Evans-Cowley et al. (2005) provide weak empirical 
evidence showing that impact fees decrease the value of undeveloped land. 
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impact fees to the buyers. Secondhand house sale prices have increased by about 
10.5%, possibly because sellers of secondhand houses take advantage of housing 
capital gain. They also find that development permits decrease by about 11%, 
suggesting that impact fees might decrease the supply of housing. 
Mathur et al. (2004) use data from 14,103 new single family house 
transactions from King County, Washington during the period from 1991 to 2000 
and find that imposing a one dollar impact fee increases the price of new housing 
on average by 1.7 dollars. The increase is 3.6 dollars for high-quality housing but 
is minor for low-quality housing. Since the increase in housing prices is larger 
than the impact fee itself, this suggests that social benefits generated by 
incremental local public services that are financed by impact fee revenues will 
eventually be capitalized into housing prices. Similarly, using the data from Dade 
County in Florida, Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy (2004) find that during the period 
from 1986 to 2000 increasing the impact fee by one dollar raises new home 
prices and secondhand home prices by about 1.6 dollars. In addition, Dresch and 
Sheffrin (1997) and Baden and Coursey (2002) also test the effects of impact fees 
on housing prices in other cities but find a very small elasticity; however, their 
studies fail to account for neighborhood characteristics of housing units.4 
Impact fees have been implemented in China for more than two decades. 
Nowadays many Chinese cities charge impact fees. However, no empirical study 
is available in China to quantify the effect of impact fees on real estate prices. 
This paper is the first attempt to provide such empirical evidence. 
4  Data 
Our data come from two sources. The real estate price data are purchased from 
the China Index Academy, a leading research institute specializing in the real 
estate industry in China. 5  The data contain quarterly price indexes for 
newly-built housing and for newly-transferred urban land for 35 large- and 
medium-sized cities in China since 1998.6  The original price indexes are 
chain-based; we transform the data to be fixed-based, using the first quarter of 
1998 as the base period. We use the mean of the four quarter indexes of a city in 
each year as the annual index of that city. For some years, the data for average 
housing prices at the city level is available; therefore, we can impute the time 
series of price levels based on the time series of price indexes. 
                                                        
4 For a survey of the literature on the effects of impact fees on real estate prices, see 
Evans-Cowley and Lawhon (2003) or visit http://www.impactfees.com. 
5 The China Index Academy’s official web site is http://industry.soufun.com. 
6 In China urban land belongs to the state. Local city governments transfer only land use rights 
to land users for certain years and charge a lump-sum fee. This fee can be considered the 
present value of land rents over contractual years and is generally called the “land price.” For 
an introduction to urban land markets in China, see Tao et al. (2010). 
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The authors manually collect the impact fee data, including the timing of 
implementation, and the fee amounts or fee ratios, from the official web sites of 
city governments or publicly released government documents. For data not 
disclosed on web sites and not released in government documents, we contact 
local government agencies via email or by phone. We finally assemble the impact 
fee data for the 35 cities in the sample of the real estate price data for the period 
from 1998 to 2008. There are two missing values in the land price data for Dalian 
city so we have an unbalanced panel dataset. 
In 1998 only 13 cities charge impact fees; in 2008 all cities charge impact fees. 
Four cities calculate the impact fees they charge as a percentage of total 
investment. For example, Nanning and Guangzhou respectively charge 1.5% and 
5.5% of total investment as impact fees. In addition, Guiyang switches from 
proportional impact fees to impact fee level in 2008. All other cities charge a 
fixed fee for each square meter of floor area of a development project. The 
highest impact fee is 370 yuan per square meter of floor area charged by the 
Shanghai city government; the mean impact fee of cities that charge per square 
meter of floor area is 83 yuan per square meter. Because the consumer price 
index data at the city level is not available in China, to convert nominal terms 
into real terms, we use the consumer price index at the provincial level to adjust 
nominal terms. Table 1 presents the summary statistics of key variables in our 
econometric models. 
 
Table 1  Summary Statistics 
Variable Sample size Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Annual housing price index: nominal 385 119.1 21.2 90.1 217.0 
Annual housing price index: real 385 102.3 14.0 77.7 167.6 
Average housing price: nominal 385 3,294.2 2,032.9 1,252.9 12,905.1 
Average housing price: real 385 2,836.7 1,705.0 1,121.9 11,047.8 
Annual land price index: nominal 383 125.0 49.2 81.2 692.9 
Annual land price index: real 383 107.2 37.7 69.6 535.1 
Impact fee dummy 385 0.7 0.4 0 1 
Impact fee level: nominal 330 82.7 85.6 0 370 
Impact fee level: real 330 69.5 71.4 0 329.6 
Consumer price index 385 116.0 8.8 99.6 154.6 
Note: The sample size for the annual land price index variables is 383 because Dalian has two 
missing values. Five cities use proportional impact fees. Therefore the sample size for 
the impact fee level variables is 330. 
 
5  Model Specification and Empirical Results 
To test the effect of impact fees on urban real estate prices, we specify the 
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following general model: 
1 2 3it i it t it itP I T Cα β β β ε= + + + + ,             (1) 
where P is one of these variables: price index of newly-built housing, price level 
of newly-built housing, or price index of newly-transferred urban land. I is a 
dummy variable set to 1 if a city charges an impact fee in a year; in some models 
we also use the impact fee level. Tt is a dummy for year t and αi is the city fixed 
effect for city i. Cit is the vector of other city attributes; in some cases, we include 
the lagged impact fee level. For all models, the standard errors are estimated 
using the Hubert-White robust standard error estimator and are clustered at the 
city level. 
Our preferred specification is the city fixed-effect model without year 
dummies. The justification is as follows. First, in many cases we could not add 
both cities fixed effects and year dummies at the same time because doing so 
generates serious multicollinear problems.7 For example, in 2008 all cities 
charge impact fees so the impact fee dummy coincides with the year dummy for 
2008. Second, since real estate markets are local, locational fundamentals should 
have much stronger effects on real estate prices than do nationwide 
macroeconomic shocks. In addition, our focus is the impact fee variable and 
impact fees are set by local governments. In many cities impact fees do not 
change for a few years once they are set; therefore, impact fee variables can be 
considered orthogonal to nationwide macroeconomic shocks. Omitting year 
dummies may reduce the R-squared but would not seriously bias the coefficient 
estimate of the impact fee variable. 
Adding the lagged housing (or land) price index is tricky. On the one hand, 
housing prices exhibit serial correlation characteristics and the lagged housing 
price is a very good predictor of the current housing price; on the other hand, the 
lagged housing price captures the effects of all lagged price determinants, 
making current price determinants of little explanatory power. It is worth noting 
here that clustering the standard error at the city level can take into account the 
intra-city correlation of disturbance terms. 
We estimate model (1) for the housing price index, the housing price level, 
and the land price index, respectively. The results are reported in the following 
subsections. 
 
5.1  Impact Fees and the Housing Price Index 
 
Table 2 reports the effects of imposing impact fees on the price index of 
newly-built housing. Columns (1)–(3) use the nominal annual housing price 
                                                        
7 Although we have tried including other city attributes, such as population and income, they 
generally lead to similar results and contribute very little to the R-squared. We believe city 
fixed effects capture most parts of cross-city variations; therefore, we do not report the results 
including other variables of city attributes. Our reported results are the upper bound estimates.  
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index as the dependent variable; columns (4)–(6) use the real annual housing 
price index as the dependent variable. In five of the six models, the coefficients 
of the impact fee dummy are positive and statistically significant; this shows that 
imposing impact fees increases the housing price index. Columns (3) and (6) are 
city fixed-effect models with lagged housing prices as additional controls. The 
lagged housing price index absorbs all the effects of past price determinants, 
making the adjusted R-squared extremely high (above 0.95). The coefficient of 
the impact fee dummy is positive and significant for the nominal housing price 
model but insignificant for the real housing price model; and this pattern holds 
true for all other tables in this paper. This specification may be good for 
forecasting but not helpful in separating the effects of contemporaneous price 
determinants. In these two specifications, the coefficient of the impact fee 
dummy is the lowest bound of the estimate, but probably too conservative to be 
economically meaningful. Therefore, we do not report these results in the other 
tables in the rest of the paper. 
Our preferred specifications are the city fixed-effect models in columns (2) 
and (5), showing that for a given city its nominal (real) housing price index 
increases by about 23 (10) percentage points after an impact fee is imposed. We 
should point out that since we do not include nationwide macroeconomic shocks 
and other time-varying city attributes such as population and income, the 
coefficient of the impact fee dummy might be slightly overestimated. 
 
Table 2  Impact Fee Dummy and Housing Price Index 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Impact fee dummy 1.840
***
(1.95) 
22.967***
(11.18)
3.214***
(5.31) 
2.147** 
(2.19) 
10.393*** 
(5.53) 
0.653 
(1.34) 
(Housing price index)t−1   
1.091***
(66.87)   
0.946*** 
(91.42) 
Year dummy Yes No No Yes No No 
City fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.584 0.350 0.966 0.313 0.454 0.950 
Sample size 385 385 350 385 385 350 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal housing price index in columns (1)–(3) and the 
real housing price index in columns (4)–(6). Numbers in parentheses below the 
coefficients are t statistics. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
 
Table 3 replaces the impact fee dummy with the logarithmic of the impact fee 
level. Because Guangzhou, Guiyang, Nanning, Shenzhen, and Yinchuan use a 
proportional impact fee policy, they are dropped in this estimation. Columns (1), 
(2), (4) and (5) use a contemporaneous impact fee level, while columns (3) and 
(6) also include a lagged impact fee level to take into account the lag effect. The 
dependent variable in columns (1)–(3) is the nominal housing price index; it is 
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the real housing price index in columns (4)–(6). The coefficients of the 
logarithmic impact fee in columns (1)–(5) are all positive and significant at the 
1% level. Our preferred specifications are columns (2) and (5), suggesting that 
for a given city, if the nominal (real) impact fee increases by 1%, the nominal 
(real) housing price index will increase by about 5 (2) percentage points. Note 
that in columns (3) and (6) the coefficients of the lagged impact fee are still 
positive, significant, and with similar magnitudes to those in columns (2) and (5), 
providing evidence for the causal effect of impact fees on housing prices. 
 
Table 3  Impact Fee Level and Housing Price Index 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log ((Impact fee level)t) 
1.324***
(5.13) 
5.260***
(10.89)
1.424***
(3.55) 
0.983***
(3.67) 
2.425*** 
(5.10) 
0.170 
(0.62) 
Log (Impact fee levelt−1)   
4.543***
(6.91)   
2.377*** 
(3.90) 
Year dummy Yes No No Yes No No 
City fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.630 0.338 0.394 0.348 0.434 0.501 
Sample size 330 330 300 330 330 300 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal housing price index in columns (1)–(3) and the 
real housing price index in columns (4)–(6). The impact fee levels are nominal in 
columns (1)–(3) and real in columns (4)–(6). Numbers in parentheses below the 
coefficients are t statistics. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
 
5.2  Impact Fees and the Housing Price Level 
 
Corresponding to Tables 2 and 3, we estimate the models for the housing price 
level. Table 4 presents the effects of imposing impact fees on the housing price 
level. Our preferred specifications are the models presented in columns (2) and 
(4), suggesting that for a given city, after imposing impact fees, the nominal 
housing price increases by 540 yuan per square meter of floor area and the real  
 
Table 4  Impact Fee Dummy and Housing Price Level 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Impact fee dummy 1,120.12
*** 
(5.66) 
540.305*** 
(7.48) 
987.35*** 
(5.57) 
360.915*** 
(4.39) 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No 
City fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.102 0.901 0.072 0.944 
Sample size 385 385 385 385 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal housing price level in columns (1) and (2) and the 
real housing price level in columns (3) and (4). Numbers in parentheses below the 
coefficients are t statistics. ***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
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housing price increases by 361 yuan per square meter of floor area. It is 
interesting to note that the values of R2 in the city fixed-effect models are very 
high (above 0.9), suggesting that even if year-dummies and other time-varying 
city attributes are added, the explanatory power of the city fixed-effect models 
would not be improved much. 
Table 5 shows that increasing the impact fee by one yuan increases the 
housing price by more than one yuan. Specifically, in our preferred models 
presented in columns (2) and (5), for a given city, increasing the nominal impact 
fee by one yuan leads to an increase of about 4.8 yuan in the nominal housing 
price; increasing the real impact fee by one yuan leads to an increase of about 2.4 
yuan in the real housing price. These results are in line with the findings from the 
American data and suggest that the social benefits generated by incremental local 
public goods that are financed by impact fee revenues may have been capitalized 
into housing prices. 
 
Table 5  Impact Fee Level and Housing Price Level 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
(Impact fee level)t 9.244
***
(9.51) 
4.773***
(6.45) 
0.803**
(2.14) 
8.389***
(9.50) 
2.364*** 
(3.48) 
–0.707 
(–1.49) 
(Impact fee level)t−1   
4.769***
(4.90)   
3.407*** 
(3.81) 
Year dummy Yes No No Yes No No 
City fixed effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.259 0.881 0.889 0.209 0.919 0.925 
Sample size 330 330 300 330 330 300 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal housing price level in columns (1)–(3) and the 
real housing price level in columns (4)–(6). The impact fee level is nominal in columns 
(1)–(3) and real in columns (4)–(6). Numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t 
statistics. Superscripts “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
 
We also estimate a log-log model by replacing the housing price level and the 
impact fee level in the models presented in Table 5 by their logarithmic values. 
The coefficient of the impact fee variable can now be interpreted as elasticity. 
Table 6 presents the results. Almost all the elasticity coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant but very small, between 0.03-0.07. Because the housing 
price is very high compared with the impact fee level, a very small elasticity still 
means a large economic effect. For example, the 2008 mean housing price of the 
35 cities in our sample is 4,223 yuan per square meter. If the impact fee 
increases from the mean value of 83 yuan to 91.3 yuan (a 10% increase), an 
elasticity of 0.05 implies that the housing price will increase by 21 yuan, 2.5 
times the increase of the impact fee. This result is consistent with what we find 
in Table 5. 
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Table 6  Logarithmic Impact Fee Level and Logarithmic Housing Price Level 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log((Impact fee level)t) 
0.071***
(6.42) 
0.045***
(11.45)
0.011***
(3.40) 
0.072***
(6.35) 
0.024*** 
(5.06) 
–0.0003 
(–0.10) 
Log((Impact fee level)t−1)   
0.040***
(7.93)   
0.026*** 
(4.66) 
Year dummy Yes No No Yes No No 
City fixed effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.189 0.900 0.909 0.128 0.941 0.947 
Sample size 330 330 300 330 330 300 
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithmic nominal housing price level in columns (1)–(3) 
and the logarithmic real housing price level in columns (4)–(6). The impact fee levels are 
nominal in columns (1)–(3) and real in columns (4)–(6). Numbers in parentheses below 
the coefficients are t statistics. Superscripts “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance levels 
of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
 
5.3  Impact Fees and the Land Price Index 
 
We also test the effect of impact fees on the land price index. Table 7 presents the 
effect of imposing impact fees on the nominal and real land price indexes. In all 
models the coefficient of the impact fee dummy is positive and statistically 
significant, showing that the imposition of impact fees leads to an increase in the 
land price index. Again, our preferred models are the city fixed-effect models. 
Columns (2) and (4) show that for a given city the imposition of impact fees 
increases the nominal (real) land price index by about 35 (18) percentage points. 
This is a very large effect and is different from the prediction of Yinger’s model 
that impact fees depress the price of undeveloped land (Yinger, 1998). The 
possible interpretation is that a part of the impact fee revenues have been used to 
finance new urban public goods. The social benefits from those incremental 
urban public goods have been capitalized into real estate prices. Since local 
governments monopolize the transfer of land use rights, the expectation of real 
estate appreciation due to improved or incremental local public goods will also 
be reflected by the prices of newly-transferred land. 
 
Table 7  Impact Fee Dummy and Land Price Index 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
Impact fee dummy 2.887
* 
(1.65) 
34.661*** 
(4.27) 
2.997* 
(1.74) 
17.802*** 
(2.80) 
Year dummy Yes No Yes No 
City fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.220 0.331 0.121 0.376 
Sample size 383 383 383 383 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal land price index in columns (1) and (2) and the 
real land price index in columns (3) and (4). Numbers in parentheses below the 
coefficients are t statistics. Superscripts “***”, “**” and “*” indicate significance levels of 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the city level. 
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Table 8 presents the results by replacing the impact fee dummy in the models 
presented in Table 7 with the logarithmic of the impact fee level. The city 
fixed-effect models (columns (2) and (5)) show that for a given city, a 1% 
increase in the nominal (real) impact fee leads to an increase of about 7.2 (4.1) 
percentage points in the nominal (real) land price index.  
 
Table 8  Impact Fee Level and Land Price Index 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Log((Impact fee level)t) 0.895
**
(1.99)
7.188***
(4.15)
1.173 
(0.88) 
0.641
(1.22)
4.053*** 
(2.75) 
–0.100 
(–0.08) 
Log((Impact fee level)t−1)   
6.873**
(2.44)   
4.388* 
(1.80) 
Year dummy Yes No No Yes No No 
City fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.234 0.315 0.353 0.136 0.358 0.399 
Sample size 328 328 298 328 328 298 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal land price index in columns (1)–(3) and the real 
land price index in columns (4)–(6). The impact fee level is nominal in columns (1)–(3) 
and real in columns (4)–(6). Numbers in parentheses below the coefficients are t statistics. 
***, ** and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors 
are clustered at the city level.  
6  Conclusion 
The impact fee policy has been practiced for more than two decades in many 
Chinese cities. However, no empirical studies have quantified the effect of 
impact fees on real estate prices in urban China. Using a panel data set for 35 
large and medium sized cities from 1998 to 2008, we find that impact fees lead to 
a significant increase in real estate prices. For a given city, an increase in the 
impact fee by one yuan leads to an increase of about 5 yuan in the price of 
newly-built housing; a 1% increase in the impact fee level leads to an increase of 
5–7 percentage points in the housing price index and the land price index. Our 
results suggest that the impact fee is one of many important factors that have 
contributed to the rapid increase in urban real estate prices in China during the 
past few decades. 
Our findings have policy implications for local city governments. Property tax 
revenues are a very important source of funding for financing local public 
services in American cities. Chinese cities do not levy property taxes but levy 
impact fees to finance local public goods. Some Chinese cities, such as 
Chongqing and Shanghai, are moving in the direction of implementing property 
taxation. If property taxation is implemented and the revenues are used to finance 
local public goods, then, impact fees can be reduced or even removed. This will 
slow down the fast growth of real estate prices in Chinese cities. 
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